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abstract
Response efficacy was a significant predictor of four 
pre-416 and two post-fire mitigation actions, and self-
efficacy was a significant predictor of two post-416 
mitigation actions. Further, significant differences exist 
for all pre-416 and post-416 mitigation actions which 
shows the impact that the fire had on respondent 
intentions to mitigate for future wildfire risks. 
This research contributed to the broader literature by 
identifying how perceptions and mitigation behaviors 
change after experiencing a near-miss wildfire event, 
and to local wildfire management efforts by providing 
insights into specific mitigation actions to incentivize 
through local assistance programs.
This research used Protection Motivation Theory 
to examine if and how individuals who experience a 
near-miss wildfire event (i.e., a recent, proximal wildfire 
that did not harm these individuals or their properties) 
intend to protect themselves against future risks. 
We administered a drop-off pick-up survey to 
residents living in Durango, Colorado, a community 
heavily impacted by the 416 fire in the spring and 
summer of 2018. The survey, completed by 195 
residents, solicited information about wildfire 
mitigation behaviors taken before and after the 
416 fire. Data were also collected on four of the 
dimensions of Protection Motivation Theory which 
may influence individuals’ willingness to mitigate 
future wildfire risks. 
Figure 1. View of the 416 fire in La Plata County.
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Introduction
Wildfires are increasing in frequency and severity 
across the West. Additionally, a growing number of 
people are living in at-risk wildland urban interface 
areas (Radeloff et al., 2018). With greater proportions 
of the population being exposed to the risk of more 
probable wildfires, federal, state, and local land 
managers need to understand how homeowners 
prepare for and respond to wildfire risks. Despite the 
fact that social scientists have made substantial efforts 
to better understand homeowners’ risk perceptions 
and their preparedness behaviors in anticipation 
of future wildfires, little is known about how risk 
perceptions and mitigation behaviors change in 
response to experiencing a near-miss wildfire event 
(Dupéy & Smith, 2018; McCaffrey & Olsen, 2012; 
McCaffrey, Toman, Stidham, & Shindler, 2013; Toman, 
Stidham, McCaffrey, & Shindler, 2013). 
Previous research has found an increase in individuals’ 
preparedness immediately following a natural hazard 
event (Russell, Goltz & Bourque, 1995). Surveying 
residents in the months following a wildfire can 
provide a deeper understanding of how experience 
with wildfire shapes individuals’ risk perceptions 
associated with future wildfires, and their behavioral 
intentions to lower vulnerability to the risks associated 
with future fires. Further, near-miss events describe 
avoided disasters which have the potential to result 
in extreme damage (e.g., loss or life or property). 
Near-miss events can provide a false sense of security 
to individuals. Research on near-miss events in the 
context of hurricanes has shown that individuals 
who experience near-miss events are likely to have 
perceptions that reflect this ‘missed’ experience; they 
are likely to believe and make subsequent decisions 
on the idea that the situation is less risky (Dillon & 
Tinsley, 2016; Dillon, Tinsley, & Cronin, 2011). Near-
miss wildfire events in the wildland-urban interface 
have not been empirically examined despite the fact 
that these individuals are likely to perceive and make 
decisions based on this ‘missed’ experience. This 
study uses Protection Motivation Theory to better 
understand how wildland-urban interface residents 
that have experienced a near-miss wildfire event 
perceive future risks and whether or not they intend 
to implement mitigation actions that will reduce this 
future risk. Protection Motivation Theory suggests 
two processes – threat and coping appraisals – shape 
individuals’ decision to protect themselves and their 
property from a given threat (Figure 2; Bubeck, Botzen 
& Aerts, 2012). 
Threat appraisals involve individuals identifying how 
bad the consequences of a threat will be (perceived 
severity) and estimating the probability of that threat 
occurring (perceived vulnerability). Next, coping 
appraisals involve individuals’ belief that a specific 
mitigation action will reduce future risks (response 
efficacy), their assessment of their capacity to carry 
out the action (self-efficacy), and their estimate of 
how much will it cost (in time, money labor, etc.) to 
implement the action (response costs) (Bubeck, Botzen 
& Aerts, 2012). Results from the combination of 
these two appraisals helps predict if an individual will 
engage in a protective or maladaptive (non-protective) 
response to a threat (Figure 2).
This study was guided by two general research 
questions:
1. Which, if any, dimension of Protection Motivation 
Theory was the best predictor of wildfire mitigation 
behaviors?
2. Does a recent, proximal, wildfire influence residents’ 
perceptions or self-reported mitigation behaviors?
Background on the 416 wildfire
The 416 wildfire (Figure 4) was identified by tracking 
active wildfires throughout the 2018 fire season using 
InciWeb data (InciWeb, n.d.). This database provides 
detailed information (e.g., location, date, anticipated 
containment date, size, weather concerns, projected 
fire activity) on active wildfires. The 416 wildfire 
in La Plata County, Colorado was selected due to 
meeting our fire selection criteria [it exceeded 8,000 
ha (~20,000 acres) pre-containment, involved the 
evacuation of at least 100 residents, had wildland 
urban interface and intermix areas within 6 kilometers 
Figure 2. The appraisal processes and associated di-
mensions of Protection Motivation Theory.
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(~10 miles), and had an anticipated containment date 
of 8/1/2018]. The 416 wildfire started on Friday June 
1, 2018 around 10:02 a.m. approximately 6 kilometers 
(~10 miles) north of Durango, Colorado. The cause 
of the fire is still unknown, however there are strong 
accusations and lawsuits against the Durango & 
Silverton Narrow Gauge Railroad as the ignition source 
(Romeo, 2018). The 416 wildfire blazed through 
approximately 21,613 ha (83 mi2) of U.S. Forest Service 
land and 292 ha (1.1 mi2) of private land consisting of 
brush (< 0.5 m; < 2.0 ft), timber (grass and understory), 
and timber (litter and understory) fuels.
The location of the 416 wildfire and nearby residents 
provided a unique opportunity to understand how 
residents protected themselves prior to, and plan 
to protect themselves following a recent, proximal 
fire. The 416 wildfire placed a direct threat on the 
residents in the Animas Valley along Highway 550, 
where the wildland urban interface and intermix is 
present. The fire perimeter encroached on interface 
and intermix residents on the west side of the valley. 
The valley is narrow, with one main entrance to the 
north and one to the south. This can present difficulty 
in evacuating residents. Many residents in the Animas 
Valley evacuated from their homes, and a number of 
them were exposed to fire related risks (e.g., smoke, 
limited evacuation routes, immediate proximity to fire). 
The proximity of the 416 wildfire and the location of 
residents allowed us to collect data on individuals who 
were more likely to respond to wildfire in a protective 
manner, compared to those who experienced a similar 
fire but were more than a 1.0 km from the perimeter, 
or only impacted by smoke.
methods
Survey procedures
Spatial data for the 416 wildfire, evacuation zone, and 
parcel data from La Plata County were compiled to 
identify all residents near the eastern burn perimeter. 
We sampled both individuals that were and were not 
evacuated, and spatial boundaries were identified to 
only sample residents who were within the northern 
and southern ends of the 416 evacuation zone. We 
excluded parcels with two addresses (indicating 
the parcel was a second home), condominiums, 
Figure 3. View of the 416 burn perimeter from one survey respondent’s property.
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Figure 4. The 416 wildfire burn perimeter (red 
polygon) and all residences that were included in the 
sample for this study (green dots).
apartments, and other rental properties, since these 
individuals likely are not able to engage in wildfire 
mitigation on their property. All residents within these 
geographic and sampling boundaries were included 
as potential survey respondents. We used a random 
number generator to extract 500 parcels based on a 
geospatial ID number into a sampling list. The sampled 
parcels were mapped to maximize travel time between 
parcels during the drop-off/pick-up survey effort. Once 
in the field it was apparent that parcels in the northern 
valley were secondary and vacation homes with little 
to no current occupancy, thus, these parcels were 
excluded from sampling. To account for this loss, we 
randomly re-sampled the remaining southern parcels 
to reach the desired sample size (n = 500).
Previous research has shown substantially higher 
average response rates for drop-off/pick-up surveys 
when compared to traditional mail surveys (Lovelock, 
Stiff, Cullwick & Kaufman, 1976; Melevin, Dillman, 
Baxter & Lamiman, 1999). To achieve the highest 
response rate possible, we utilized the drop-off/pick-
up method with the option to mail the survey back 
in a pre-paid envelope. Surveys were administered 
in person by three research assistants, one of whom 
was the lead author on this report. We knocked on 
each door selected from the random sample and 
asked for the person in charge of yard and house 
maintenance to complete the survey. Asking the head 
of the household to fill the survey out in person can 
increase response rates by approximately 10 to 37% 
compared to other methods (i.e., handing the survey to 
whomever answers the door, or leaving the survey on 
the doorknob with no face-to-face contact) (Melevin, 
Dillman, Baxter & Lamiman, 1999). The surveys were 
administered between November 7 and November 21, 
2018.
Survey design
The drop-off/pick-up survey was designed to measure 
each of the processes described in the Protection 
Motivation Theory literature (Table 1). Protection 
Motivation Theory posits that two cognitive appraisals 
(threat and coping appraisals) shape the decision 
to protect one’s self from a given threat (Bubeck, 
Botzen & Aerts, 2012). Threat appraisals includes 
two dimensions: 1) perceived severity (How bad the 
consequences of a threat will be) and 2) perceived 
vulnerability (the probability of a threat occurring). 
Coping appraisals includes three dimensions: 1) 
response efficacy (belief that the mitigation action 
taken will reduce risk); 2) self-efficacy (belief in one’s 
capacity to carry out the action); and 3) the response 
costs (how much will it cost to implement the action) 
(Bubeck, Botzen & Aerts, 2012). Due to the cross-
sectional nature of our study, we were not able to ask 
about all dimensions of Protection Motivation Theory 
both before and after the 416 wildfire. Perceived 
severity before the 416 fire was elicited by asking 
residents to estimate their level of concern about 
wildfire prior to fire. For both perceived severity and 
response efficacy, we asked respondents to estimate 
their beliefs prior to the fire as well as at the time 
they were surveyed (i.e., post-fire). Self-efficacy 
and response costs were only measured at the time 
residents were surveyed. Each dimension, along with 
its specific measure and temporal reference is shown 
in Table 1.  
In addition to the measures of the five dimensions of 
Protection Motivation Theory, the survey included 
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questions to provide context on: awareness of and 
participation in local mitigation programs, barriers 
to previous and intended wildfire mitigation, and 
evacuation experiences. The survey tested if and 
which dimensions of Protection Motivation Theory 
influenced past or future mitigation behaviors. 
Collectively, the drop-off/pick-up survey collected data 
on:
• All five dimensions of Protection Motivation Theory 
related to wildfire events in the Animas Valley.
• Mitigation behaviors taken before and after the 416 
fire;
• Barriers to implementing mitigation behaviors prior to 
and after the fire;
• Experiences with the evacuation that occurred during 
the fire; and 
• Respondents’ sociodemographic characteristics.
Data analysis
Descriptive statistics
Descriptive analyses investigated standard 
sociodemographic information (e.g., gender, education, 
income), and non-traditional demographic information 
that may lead to insights on what these individuals 
are protecting (e.g., children, livestock, pets). These 
results were compiled to provide sociodemographic 
information on the respondents in this survey. 
Additional descriptive analyses provide a broad 
overview of evacuation experiences, awareness of and 
participation in local mitigation programs, and barriers 
to mitigation across all survey respondents.
Research question 1
To answer research question 1 (Which, if any, facet 
of Protection Motivation Theory is the best predictor 
of wildfire mitigation behaviors?) we used a series 
of eighteen binary logistic regression models. The 
dependent variables in these models were the nine 
mitigation behaviors residents could have taken, or 
could take in the future, to reduce their wildfire risk. 
We asked about residents’ behaviors both before and 
after the 416 fire, creating a total of 18 behavioral 
measures. We regressed each behavior on the 
appropriate set of measures corresponding to each of 
the dimensions of Protection Motivation Theory.
Research question 2
To answer research question 2 (Does a recent, 
proximal, wildfire influence resident perceptions or 
self-reported mitigation behaviors?) we compared 
respondents’ perceived vulnerability and wildfire 
mitigation actions pre- and post-416 fire and ran Chi-
square tests to test for significance between pre- and 
post-416 fire mitigation behaviors.
Table 1. Appraisal processes, dimensions, definitions and drop-off pick-up survey 
questions associated with Protection Motivation Theory.
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results
Descriptive analysis
In total, 500 surveys were delivered to residents 
within the pre-evacuation and evacuation zones. Of 
those, two residents (0.4%) declined to participate, 
204 (40.8%) were face-to-face deliveries and 294 
(58.8%) were left on the door knob. A total of 195 
usable surveys were returned for a total response 
rate of 39%. We did not conduct any tests for non-
response bias given the response rate was more than 
acceptable for public opinion research (Dillman, Smyth 
& Christian, 2008).
To describe our respondents, we separated them 
into short- and long- term based on research that 
designates 10 or more years as ‘long-term’ (Hunter, 
Boardman & Onge, 2005). We had nearly equal 
responses from short-term (49%) and long-term (51%) 
residents. Additionally, the overwhelming majority 
(94%) of respondents were primary residents (i.e., the 
parcel was not a vacation home or second home). We 
also had nearly equal responses from males (54%) and 
females (45%) (Table 2). Over 75% were born between 
1930 and 1970 and nearly half were retired (48%). 
Those who were still employed held a number of jobs, 
such as: carpenter, civil engineer, chef, mechanic, 
professor, restaurant owner, ski instructor, truck driver, 
and writer. Our respondents were well educated; 
nearly 80% had a bachelors, masters, doctoral, or 
professional degree. They were also fairly affluent; the 
average annual household income was $131,176 with 
less than 10% having an annual household income 
under $40,000.
Evacuation experiences
We asked three questions to better understand the 
evacuation experiences of respondents. First, we 
identified the number of respondents who were on 
mandatory evacuation (39.8%) the number who were 
on pre-evacuation but still chose to evacuate (8.2%), 
and the number who did not evacuate (50%). We 
asked those who evacuated (by choice or mandate) to 
indicate any ‘last minute’ actions they took to protect 
their home or property. Approximately 71% indicated 
they implemented at least one protective measure 
prior to evacuation. The most common protective 
actions included moving flammable or combustible 
material from the deck or around the house (30.5%), 
leaving water buckets and/or hoses out for firefighters 
(25.7%), and turning off propane or moving gas tanks 
from the house (24.8%). Some residents (<10%) 
cleared brush from next to the house, left lights on, 
left notes or signs for firefighters, shut their windows 
and vents. Finally, we asked respondents who were 
evacuated to indicate how far they had to travel to 
get to their temporary evacuation location. Distances 
ranged from 1.6 kilometers (1 mile) to 1600 kilometers 
(1000 miles), with an average distance of 74 miles.
 
Awareness of and participation in local wildfire 
mitigation programs
We also asked a series of questions to understand if 
respondents were aware of local wildfire mitigation 
programs, whether or not they participated, and the 
reasons why they chose not to participate. Overall, 
approximately 40% of respondents were aware of 
these programs (n = 83) and nearly 16% participated in 
a mitigation program within the last year (n = 31). The 
most common response was participating in FireWise 
Table 2. The age, gender, education and income level 
of 416 fire survey respondents.
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certification or being part of a FireWise community 
(61.3%). 
Of the respondents who did not participate in a 
mitigation program within the last year, about 60% 
provided an explanation as to why (n = 70). The most 
common reasons were that respondents: engaged in 
mitigation themselves (n = 25); didn’t believe they 
lived in an area that required mitigation (n=  19); were 
unaware of these programs (n = 14); monetary costs or 
time (n = 3); or they didn’t think their home or property 
would be threatened (n = 2).
Barriers to wildfire mitigation
To better understand what hinders wildfire mitigation, 
we asked respondents to indicate barriers they faced 
prior to the 416 fire, and barriers they anticipate facing 
in the 2019 fire season. Prior to the 416 wildfire the 
most common barriers were a lack of time (38.6%), not 
enough help with the tasks (27.9%), and other financial 
obligations (26.9%). Following the 416 wildfire 
respondents still perceived a lack of time (15.3%) and/
or help with the tasks (13.3%) as the main barriers 
with the inclusion of potential health issues or illness 
(11.9%) as an additional barrier to mitigating risk (Table 
3). This increase in potential health issues or illness 
could be due to the average age of respondents; over 
75% are over the age of 49. These results can shed 
light on how to navigate assistance programs in the 
2019 fire season based on specific resident needs and 
identified trends in barriers to wildfire mitigation.
In addition, respondents were asked to describe any 
additional barriers they faced in mitigating risk prior to 
the 416 wildfire and barriers they anticipate during the 
upcoming 2019 fire season. In total, 32 respondents 
mentioned additional barriers prior to the 416 wildfire 
(n = 9) or perceived future barriers (n = 23) such 
as: neighbors brush creeping onto their property, 
homeowners’ associations, enjoying the natural look, 
their residence is a rental, not being able to financially 
Figure 5. One of many local businesses showing sup-
port for the firefighters who saved houses and busi-
nesses from the 416 fire.
Table 3. Self-reported barriers to engage in wildfire mitigation 
prior to and following the 416 wildfire.
afford mitigation, or being absent prior to the 416 
ignition. After answering questions about perceived 
future barriers to wildfire mitigation, respondents were 
asked ‘Considering all of the costs associated with 
protecting your home and property from wildfire risk 
(labor, time, money), do you think the costs are worth 
the benefits?’ Nearly 90% said the costs are worth the 
benefits, approximately 9% were unsure, and less than 
2% said the costs are not worth the benefits.
 
Dimensions of Protection Motivation Theory
Perceived severity. Perceived severity was measured 
by asking, ‘When you first heard about the 416 fire 
did you think it would grow large enough to threaten 
residential areas?’ Most respondents (80%) thought it 
was somewhat or very likely, 12% thought it was not 
very or somewhat unlikely, and 8% were unsure. 
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Perceived vulnerability. To measure residents’ 
perceptions of vulnerability to wildfire prior to and 
after the 416 fire we asked two questions: 1) ‘Before 
the 416 wildfire, how likely did you think it was that 
a wildfire could start in Animas Valley?’, and 2) ‘How 
likely do you think it is that a wildfire could start in 
Animas Valley next year?’ Prior to the 416 wildfire 
most respondents (88.3%) believed it was somewhat 
or very likely (Table 4) that a wildfire could happen in 
Animas Valley. However, after the 416 wildfire only 
68.9% believed a wildfire was somewhat or very likely 
to happen in Animas Valley in 2019 (Table 4).
Response efficacy. To understand how individuals’ 
perceptions of the effectiveness of mitigation actions 
changed after experiencing the 416 fire we asked 
respondents to indicate how much they believed 
each mitigation action we asked about would 
reduce their risk of future wildfire damage. After 
experiencing the 416 fire, most respondents agreed 
that three mitigation behaviors had a moderate or 
major reduction to their future wildfire risk (Table 5). 
These actions included moving firewood and other 
combustibles 30 feet from the structures on their 
property (77%); disposing of dead fuel accumulation 
on property (73.5%); and thinning and pruning trees 
and shrubs within 30 feet of their home (73.3%).
Self-efficacy. To measure self-efficacy, respondents 
were asked if they believed they could undertake all 
of the mitigation actions they intended to take before 
the 2019 fire season. Nearly 80% believed they could, 
approximately 7% did not believe they could, and 
9% were unsure if they could undertake all of the 
mitigation actions planned for 2019. The remaining 5% 
did not have wildfire mitigation planned for 2019 or 
did not provide a response (1.5%). 
Response costs. To measure response costs after 
experiencing the 416 fire, one question asked 
respondents to indicate if they believed all of the costs 
associated with protecting their home and property 
from wildfire risk (e.g., labor, time, money) are worth 
the benefits. Most respondents (86.7%) stated that the 
costs were worth the benefits, less than 2% said they 
were not, and just under 10% were unsure.
Research Question 1: Which, if any, dimension of 
Protection Motivation Theory was the best predictor of 
wildfire mitigation behaviors?
To answer research question 1, we constructed and 
ran 9 pre-416 fire and 9 post-416 fire binary logistic 
regression models (18 total). Each mitigation behavior 
was regressed on three appropriate dimensions of 
Protection Motivation Theory (Table 1). The pre-
fire model used 9 mitigation behaviors residents 
could have taken prior to the 416 fire as dependent 
variables. The independent variables were perceived 
severity, perceived vulnerability, and response efficacy. 
Table 4. Pre- and post-fire perceptions of the 
likelihood a wildfire could start in Animas Valley.
Table 5. Level of perceived response efficacy for each mitigation behavior after experiencing the 416 wildfire.
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Of the three independent variables, only response 
efficacy was a significant predictor of pre-416 fire 
mitigation behaviors (Table 6). More specifically, 
response efficacy was significantly and positively 
related to: 1) creating a written or verbal plan for 
future evacuations; 2) packing an evacuation bag 
to keep in case of an emergency; 3) signing up for 
emergency text alerts; 4) screening in attics, roofs, 
eaves, and foundation vents; and 5) moving firewood 
and other combustibles 30 feet from structures (Table 
6).
The post-fire models used the same 9 mitigation 
behaviors (Table 7) that residents can implement 
to reduce their risk during future fire seasons. The 
independent variables for the post-416 wildfire 
model were perceived vulnerability, self-efficacy, 
and response efficacy. Response efficacy and self-
efficacy (i.e., belief in one’s capacity to carry out 
specified actions) were both significant predictors 
of four intended mitigation behaviors (Table 7). 
Response efficacy was a significant predictor of 
the intention to pack an evacuation bag to keep 
in case of an emergency and moving firewood and 
other combustibles 30 feet from structures on the 
property. Self-efficacy was a significant predictor of 
the intention to screen in attics, roofs, eaves, and 
foundation vents and thinning and pruning trees and 
shrubs within 30 feet of the home (Table 7).
Research Question 2: Does a recent, proximal, wildfire 
influence residents’ perceptions or self-reported 
mitigation behaviors?
To answer this question we compared respondents’ 
perceptions of the likelihood of a wildfire occurring 
in the area pre- and post-416 fire. Prior to the fire 
most respondents (88.3%) believed it was somewhat 
or very likely, however, after the fire only 68.9% 
believed a wildfire was somewhat or very likely to 
happen in Animas Valley in 2019 (Table 4). These data 
reveal a 20% reduction in resident perceptions of 
the likeliness that a wildfire could happen in Animas 
Valley after experiencing a recent fire. These results 
support previous work showing dampened risk 
perceptions after experiencing a recent, proximal 
wildfire (Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, Brown, Emel, 
Goble, Kasperson & Ratick, 1988; McGee, McFarlane 
& Varghese, 2009) or other natural hazard (Dillon, 
Tinsley & Burns, 2014; Dillon, Tinsley & Cronin, 2011; 
Dillon, Tinsley & Cronin, 2011). Interestingly, more 
Table 6. Binary logistic regression results for pre-416 fire mitigation actions and
associated dimensions of Protection Motivation Theory (predictors).
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Figure 6. Cars lined up to leave Durango during the evacuation.
Table 7. Binary logistic regression results for post-416 fire mitigation actions and
associated dimensions of Protection Motivation Theory (predictors).
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respondents were unsure (17.9%) of how likely a 
wildfire could happen in Animas Valley after the 416 
wildfire, as compared to the number that were unsure 
prior to the fire (4.1%; Table 4). More respondents 
are uncertain of the likelihood of a wildfire in the 
upcoming year after experiencing a recent, proximal 
wildfire. Collectively, these results show that 
experiencing a near-miss wildfire event decreases 
the perceived likelihood of a wildfire event (perceived 
risk) within the next year, as well as an increase in 
uncertainty about this likelihood. 
We also compared respondents’ implemented 
(pre-416 fire) and intended (post-416) mitigation 
actions. Respondents were asked to indicate which 
(if any) mitigation actions they engaged in prior 
to and which (if any) they plan to engage in after 
experiencing the 416 wildfire (Table 8). Prior to the 
416 wildfire, respondents mostly disposed of dead fuel 
accumulation on their property (60.9%); signed up for 
emergency text (or other) alerts (59.2%); or cleared 
the roof, deck, and gutters of pine needles and other 
flammable debris (58.4%). After the 416 wildfire our 
respondents are still likely to sign up for emergency 
text or other alerts (84.0%) or dispose of dead fuel 
accumulation on their property (78.1%). However, 
residents were more likely to remove flammable debris 
from foundation of home and deck (75.0%) (Table 4). 
The most significant increases in planned mitigation 
behaviors are: signing up for emergency text or other 
alerts (24.8% increase); creating a written or verbal 
plan for future evacuations (21.1%); and packing 
an evacuation bag to keep in case of an emergency 
(19.5%). These results indicate that experiences with 
the 416 wildfire pushed residents to engage in more 
personal preparedness measures in the case of an 
evacuation (e.g., create an evacuation plan, pack an 
emergency evacuation bag) as well as structural and 
vegetative mitigation (e.g., removing flammable debris, 
dispose of dead fuel accumulation).
Discussion
Response efficacy of mitigation actions increased and 
barriers to mitigation decreased after experiencing the 
416 fire
Results from this study show that individuals are 
perceiving structural and vegetative mitigation 
actions as being more effective at reducing their risk 
after experiencing a recent, proximal wildfire. To our 
knowledge the 416 fire did not damage any homes 
or residential structures, which means individuals do 
not need to directly experience wildfire damage to 
view mitigation as effective in preventing damage. 
This could be related to what previous authors refer 
to as a ‘post-exposure wake-up call’. This happens 
when individuals are exposed to a hazard which leads 
to a greater awareness of the risk and a desire to take 
proactive measures to mitigate future exposure (Arvai, 
Gregory, Ohlson, Blackwell & Gray, 2006). These 
results suggest that exposure to the 416 fire brought 
awareness to residents of the types of wildfires they 
could experience in the future, as well as served as 
a ‘wake-up call’ to view mitigation actions as more 
efficient and potentially continue to engage in the 
on-going vegetative actions. The three mitigation 
behaviors that had the most substantial increases 
(moving firewood and other combustibles 30 ft. from 
Table 8. Mitigation increases pre- and post-fire. The top 3 pre- and post- 416 wildfire mitigation 
actions and the largest increases are highlighted in red.
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structures; disposing of dead fuel accumulation; thin 
and prune trees and shrubs within 30 ft. of home) 
are vegetative actions suggested by the Colorado 
State Forest Service (C.S.F.S., 2019), and the National 
Wildfire Coordinating Group (2006). It is promising 
to see that more individuals are planning to engage 
in mitigation actions that are recognized by many 
institutions as contributing to risk reduction of 
structures and properties. An increased belief that 
these mitigation actions are effective at reducing 
wildfire risk may motivate individuals to continue 
engaging in these actions to keep their future level of 
risk low.
Prior to the 416 fire, between 15% and 40% of 
respondents were experiencing mental, physical, or 
financial barriers to completing wildfire mitigation 
actions to their home or property. After the 416 fire, 
only 8 to 13% of respondents perceive experiencing 
the aforementioned barriers in the upcoming fire 
season. This equates to a 40% to 52% reduction in 
perceived barriers after experiencing the 416 fire. As 
Figure 7. Sign found on a local resident’s garage in 
Durango.
Figure 8. Sign on a local resident’s property located on Highway 550.
mentioned above, experiencing the 416 fire may have 
demonstrated the level of risk that exists for Animas 
Valley residents and in turn, made mitigation behaviors 
seem like a small task to reduce their overall risk. 
Further, residents may be viewing this as a near-miss 
that almost happened, which previous authors have 
identified as encouraging mitigation and preparedness 
(Tinsley, Dillon & Cronin, 2012). Future work should 
incorporate survey questions that determine whether 
residents view the near-miss event as one that was 
avoided (which leads to more risky behavior) or as 
an event that could have happened (which increases 
mitigation and preparedness). This information would 
help further predict the likelihood that individuals will 
engage in future wildfire mitigation to reduce their 
overall level of risk.
Significant differences and predictors of wildfire 
mitigation behavior
 Overall, significant differences were found for 
all pre-416 and post-416 fire mitigation behaviors. 
It appears that residents in Animas Valley have been 
motivated to take action after experiencing the 
nearby 416 fire. This ties to the broader literature 
on how experience is defined and how it shapes risk 
perceptions and behavior. In this study, experience 
could be defined as: evacuation status; dealing with 
smoke, debris flows or flooding after the fire. Future 
studies should include these post-fire experiences 
into survey design to understand if there are specific 
aspects of a wildfire experience that are influencing 
intention to mitigate future wildfire risks.
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feelings or memories associated with the fire may 
have been fresh in their minds, causing them to not 
want to imagine another fire where they have to plan 
to evacuate. Self-efficacy was also not a significant 
predictor of three vegetative mitigation actions. In this 
case, our average respondent age may be contributing 
to the view that they are capable of clearing the roof, 
deck, and gutters of flammable debris, or removing 
flammable debris from the foundation. These actions 
may be too physically demanding or impossible 
for some respondents, which would explain the 
nonsignificant finding. Some respondents may create 
a list of mitigation actions they plan to complete each 
spring but run out of time when the fire season begins. 
This would make sense given ‘lack of time’ was the 
strongest barrier to mitigation both pre-416 and post-
416 fire. In addition, the action ‘dispose of dead fuel 
accumulation on property’ requires a truck or other 
large equipment, which two respondents pointed out 
in the open-ended text at the end of the survey. These 
respondents indicated that they were able to thin and 
prune the trees and brush but had no way of removing 
it since they do not own a truck. Incentive programs 
could be structured with these considerations in mind, 
and options should be provided to individuals with 
different barriers and different needs. For instance, 
those who are able to thin and prune vegetation could 
participate in a voluntary debris removal program. 
Those who are unable to physically participate in 
thinning and pruning could participate in a voluntary 
labor for mitigation program. These programs exist in 
La Plata county, however they may not be reaching 
individuals due to lack of awareness.
Conclusion
Collectively, this research offers new insights into why 
individuals take specific wildfire mitigation behaviors.
Our investigation also revealed that the 416 wildfire 
served as ‘wake-up call’ for residents in the Animas 
Valley. For all of the mitigation behaviors we asked 
about, there was a significant increase in intentions 
to take those behaviors after the wildfire. These 
results suggest that experiences with the 416 wildfire 
are pushing residents to engage in more personal 
preparedness measures in the case of an evacuation 
(e.g., create an evacuation plan, pack an emergency 
evacuation bag) as well as structural and vegetative 
mitigation (e.g., removing flammable debris, etc.).
Response efficacy (i.e., belief that the specific action 
will be effective in reducing risk) was a significant 
predictor of five pre-416 fire and two post-416 fire 
mitigation actions (seven total). However, it was not 
a significant predictor of: clearing the roof, deck, and 
gutters of pine needles and other debris; removing 
flammable debris from the foundation of home or 
deck, disposing of dead fuel accumulation on the 
property, or thinning and pruning trees and shrubs 
within 30 ft. of the home (Table 6). This means that 
respondents view these actions as less effective or 
ineffective at reducing their risk to wildfire damage. 
Interestingly, all of these actions are included in the 
Defensible Space Checklist (C.S.F.S., 2019) as actions 
that lower risk to wildfire. Since response efficacy 
was a significant predictor of other mitigation actions 
on this checklist, future efforts should be made to 
emphasize the effectiveness of these actions. Research 
shows that it is more likely that a burning ember that 
lands on a home or property ahead of the flame front 
is more likely to result in ignition and destruction 
(Protecting your home from a wildland fire, 2016). 
Consequently, engaging in all of the nonsignificant 
mitigation actions (e.g., clearing flammable debris 
from the roof, deck, gutters, and foundation of home 
or deck; disposing of dead fuel accumulation; and 
thinning and pruning trees and shrubs within 30 ft. 
of the home) would directly result in lowered risk 
to wildfire. Future education and outreach should 
emphasize how effective these mitigation actions are 
at reducing structural and vegetative wildfire risk in 
the wildland urban interface.
 Self-efficacy (i.e., belief in one’s ability to 
carry out specific actions) was a significant predictor 
of two post-416 fire mitigation behaviors: screening 
in the attic, roof, eaves and foundation vents; and 
thinning and pruning shrubs within 30 feet of the 
home. However, it was not a significant predictor of 
the intention to: create a written or verbal plan for 
future evacuations; sign up for emergency alerts; clear 
the roof, deck, and gutters of pine needles and other 
debris; remove flammable debris from foundation of 
home and deck; or dispose of dead fuel accumulation 
on the property. Respondents don’t view themselves 
as capable of undertaking these actions, which could 
be due to a variety of factors. Two of these actions 
involve preparing for future wildfire evacuations. 
Respondents may not feel capable of completing these 
given the short period of time in which the survey was 
received (i.e., 3 months after the fire). The negative 
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Grounding our investigation in Protection Motivation 
Theory, we were able to determine that response 
efficacy was as significant predictor of several planed 
mitigation actions. However, response efficacy was 
not a significant predictor of: clearing the roof, deck, 
and gutters of pine needles and other debris; removing 
flammable debris from the foundation of home or 
deck, disposing of dead fuel accumulation on the 
property, or thinning and pruning trees and shrubs 
within 30 ft. of the home. This means that respondents 
view these actions as less effective or ineffective at 
reducing their risk to wildfire damage. Future efforts 
should be made to emphasize the effectiveness of 
these actions.
Local, regional, and state planners can take the findings 
from this study into consideration when designing 
and implementing outreach and education campaigns 
intended to increase the proactive mitigation 
behaviors amongst residents living in high-risk areas of 
the wildland urban interface. 
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